Abstract
Introduction

38
Conservation biology aims to develop practical solutions to protect and restore natural 39 systems and their functions (Soulé 1985) . However, the predicted outcomes of conservation others can end up accelerating the same systems' demise. Consider for example the risk of 43 introducing new diseases during species translocations (Cunningham 1996) or the potential 44 damage from trophic cascades following eradication of invasive species (Bergstrom et al. 45 2009). Conservation decisions are routinely made in the face of such risks.
46
In expected utility theory (EUT: Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) decisions under 47 probabilistic uncertainty are represented as lotteries which can lead to different outcomes, 48 each with a given probability of occurring. Consider a hypothetical example in which 49 managers need to choose between three conservation actions (Fig. 1a) . Action A may 50 preserve either two or six species with equal probability (p=0.5); action B may preserve 51 either twenty or zero species with a probability of 0.2 and 0.8 respectively; action C is certain 52 to preserve four species. Although actions with certain outcomes are unlikely in conservation, 53 the use of a "certainty equivalent" assists in understanding risk attitude. Conservation 54 decision makers will generally seek to maximize the number of species preserved; however, 55 the action selected will also depend on their risk attitude (Pratt 1964) . In this example, a risk-56 neutral decision maker will rate all actions equally: the expected outcome (the average of the decisions. In the above example, a risk-neutral decision maker has a linear utility function:
65 they obtain the same utility from all actions with the same expected value (Fig. 1b) . A risk-
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averse decision maker will obtain greater utility (satisfaction) by avoiding poor outcomes, so 67 their utility function will be concave. A risk-seeking decision maker will have a convex 68 utility function, reflecting their preference for highly positive outcomes (Fig. 1b) .
69
A failure to account for such differences in risk attitude can lead to conflict and undermine 
Stochastic dominance
85
Case study 86 Stochastic dominance is a decision-analytic tool that allows the preferential ordering of f(x) is the cumulative probability that the value of f(x) is not greater than x. In other words, for 120 a given action the CDF represents the probability that the outcomes of that action will be 121 equal to or worse than a given value. For example, Figure 3a shows the CDFs of the for Action 2 (in-situ management only). Therefore, the probability of persistence is more 125 likely to be greater than 0.2 when doing in-situ management than when taking no action.
126
When the objective is to maximize the value of x (in this case species persistence), the 127 rational choice is to select the action with the smallest CDF for a given value of x.
128
Assuming that greater utilities will always be preferred (more is better) implies that the utility below or equal to the CDF curve for B, i.e. the two curves do not cross.
137
In the case of L. spenceri, the preference assumption is valid, since the recovery objective for 138 the species is to maximize the probability of persistence. In the first scenario (known ex-situ 139 success), the CDFs of the outcomes for all actions do not cross, and Action 5 (reintroduction 140 paired with in-situ management), has first-order dominance over all other actions (Fig. 3a) .
141
Therefore, it represents the best action for any rational decision maker, and choosing it over 142 other actions involves no risk.
143
Conversely, when ex-situ success is uncertain, the cumulative distribution functions for the 144 selected actions cross in two cases ( Fig. 3b ): between Action 2 and Action 3, and between
145
Action 4 and Action 5 (reintroduction without and with in-situ management respectively).
146
The latter pair first-order dominates all other actions, which can therefore be discarded discriminate between these two actions; second-order SD must be explored instead.
155
Second-order stochastic dominance
156
Second-order SD requires knowledge of the general risk attitude of the decision maker; that 157 is, whether they are risk-averse or risk-seeking.
158
For a risk-averse decision maker, the preference for minimizing risk implies a concave utility 159 function with a second derivative that is always negative (Fig. 1b) . Under this assumption of 160 risk aversion, we can compare actions using the ascending integral of the CDF, ∫ ( ) .
161
Action A has ascending second-order stochastic dominance over Action B if 
164
If we consider the L. spenceri scenario in which the probability of ex-situ establishment is 165 0.5, the choice is now restricted to reintroduction with and without in-situ management of 166 both source and reintroduced population, which dominated all other actions at the first order.
167
The ascending integrals of the two CDFs do not cross, so again Action 5, reintroduction with 168 in-situ management of both source and reintroduced populations, is the best action, since it 169 has second-order dominance (Fig. 4a) .
170
Conversely, a risk-seeking decision maker will prefer a higher probability of persistence even reintroduction without and with in-situ management respectively, cross (Fig 4b) . since the absolute difference between the two actions is marginal (Fig. 4b) information about uncertainty or risk attitudes, assuming risk neutrality (Fig. 1a ). An 
215
In this sense, SD is advantageous since it does not require the definition of complete utility 216 functions, which can be problematic for complex outcomes and non-monetary values.
217
Moreover, since utilities represent the preferences of individuals, the extent to which they can 
229
The specification of risk attitudes might be seen by some as an unnecessary complication.
230
Pannell (2006) found "flat payoffs" to be predominant in agricultural production: the 
